



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/15/2017

## DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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[REDACTED] On January 24, 2017, Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Peter P. STRZOK II and [REDACTED] interviewed United States (U.S.) National Security Advisor Michael T. FLYNN, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], at his office at the White House. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, FLYNN provided the following information:

[REDACTED] FLYNN's first invitation to Russia occurred when he was the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). FLYNN was the first DIA Director to be invited to GRU headquarters. During that four day trip in 2013, he participated in a leadership development program at GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) headquarters. FLYNN received proper authorization within the U.S. Government prior to conducting the trip. FLYNN could not recall if he met Russia's Ambassador to the United States, Sergey Ivanovich KISLYAK, during this trip. FLYNN described the Russians as very appreciative of his visit. During this trip to Russia as DIA Director, FLYNN first met the then-GRU Director Igor SERGUN. Following the trip, FLYNN and SERGUN continued their relationship on at least one occasion through video teleconference (VTC) and were planning a visit for SERGUN to travel to the United States on February 28, 2014. Russia invaded Crimea in the weeks prior to SERGUN's planned trip, SERGUN's trip was cancelled, and FLYNN had no further contact with the GRU Director. FLYNN described SERGUN as having common ground with FLYNN in that they had similar backgrounds, their sons were the same age, and they had a connection in fighting terrorism. SERGUN had scars from Chechnya and they shared stories about Afghanistan. FLYNN stated he called Ambassador KISLYAK following SERGUN's death in

Investigation on 01/24/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 01/24/2017

by [REDACTED] STRZOK PETER P II

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Michael Flynn, On 01/24/2017, Page 2 of 5

[REDACTED] Lebanon early last year to express his condolences. FLYNN described SERGUN as someone the U.S. could work with. FLYNN said he was not really part of the TRUMP campaign at the time of this call to KISLYAK.

[REDACTED] FLYNN stated his second trip to Russia, after he left U.S. government service, had received so much press attention that "it [was] unbelievable." As background, FLYNN explained that he was never paid directly by media entities, however, he had been a contributor to a variety of media entities including Al Jazeera, Russia Today (RT), Sky, and MSNBC. FLYNN received a request from his speakers bureau, Leading Authorities (LAI), to speak about Middle East issues at the RT 10th Anniversary reception in Moscow. FLYNN was paid for the speech by LAI. FLYNN did not know from whom LAI received payment. FLYNN met with KISLYAK at the Russian Ambassador's residence next to the University Club prior to this trip to Russia. The visit was a courtesy call to the Ambassador prior to his trip, and FLYNN took his son with him to this meeting. The meeting occurred in the mid-afternoon. In addition, FLYNN received a DIA threat briefing prior to the travel.

[REDACTED] Prior to the Presidential inauguration, FLYNN spoke to [REDACTED] e representatives in each of approximately thirty countries' governments. FLYNN stated the only exception to that practice was Russia, in that FLYNN had substantive conversations only with KISLYAK, and no other members of the Government of Russia. FLYNN's interest in Russia was as a common partner in the war on terror. FLYNN does not know if PUTIN and TRUMP will get along, but it is FLYNN's job to figure out paths to work with Russia to fight terrorism. FLYNN named the primary threats to the U.S. as the "four plus one:" China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and ISIS. FLYNN stated if the U.S. could neutralize one of the four, or even better, leverage their cooperation fighting a common enemy such as terrorism, that would be a success for U.S. national security.

[REDACTED] Sometime prior to Christmas, 2016, the Russian Ambassador [REDACTED] ey was assassinated. FLYNN called KISLYAK the next day to say he was sorry and to reinforce that terrorism was our common problem. FLYNN noted that it was a short call, and "that was it." On Christmas Day, a Russian military plane crashed and killed all on board to include what was the equivalent to the "Russian USO;" it was the same Russian choir that sang at the RT event. FLYNN called KISLYAK to pass his condolences, as his intent was to try to keep the relationship with KISLYAK going. FLYNN expanded that he has no particular affinity for Russia, but that KISLYAK was his

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Michael Flynn , On 01/24/2017 , Page 3 of 5

[REDACTED] counterpart, and maintaining trusted relationships within foreign governments is important.

[REDACTED] Shortly after Christmas, 2016, FLYNN took a vacation to the Dominican Republic with his wife. On December 28th, KISLYAK sent FLYNN a text stating, "Can you call me?" FLYNN noted cellular reception was poor and he was not checking his phone regularly, and consequently did not see the text until approximately 24 hours later. Upon seeing the text, FLYNN responded that he would call in 15-20 minutes, and he and KISLYAK subsequently spoke. The Dominican Republic was one hour ahead of the time in Washington, D.C. During the call, KISLYAK asked FLYNN to set-up a VTC between President-elect TRUMP and Russian President PUTIN on January 21st. In addition, FLYNN and KISLYAK discussed the U.S. sending an observer to a terrorism conference in Astana, Kazakhstan, that would be attended by Russia, Turkey, Iran and Syrian opposition groups. FLYNN stated he did not respond back to KISLYAK about the conference until probably this week. FLYNN did not make the decision on who would represent the U.S. until the 20th or 21st of January, and finally determined an observer from the U.S. Embassy in Astana would attend. FLYNN noted Russia wanted to take the lead for peace in the Middle East, but the U.S. needed to be the leader, particularly to keep Turkey under the U.S.'s wing. FLYNN added there was a complete lack of engagement from the prior administration.

[REDACTED] The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he had any other text, email, or personal meetings with KISLYAK or other Russians. FLYNN volunteered that after the election, he had a closed door meeting with KISLYAK and Jared KUSHNER at Trump Tower in New York City. KISLYAK was in New York to meet with his diplomats, and the three had a relatively sensitive meeting. FLYNN was a late addition to the meeting and did not participate in setting it up. FLYNN believed the meeting took place before Thanksgiving but was unsure of the date. FLYNN explained that other meetings between the TRUMP team and various foreign countries took place prior to the inauguration, and were sensitive inasmuch as many countries did not want the then-current administration to know about them. There were no personal relationships between the leaders of many countries and the prior administration. FLYNN stated that he and personnel from the incoming administration met with many countries "to set expectations for them, and the expectations were set very high."

[REDACTED] The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he recalled any [REDACTED] ions with KISLYAK about a United Nations (UN) vote surrounding the issue of Israeli settlements. FLYNN quickly

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Michael Flynn, On 01/24/2017, Page 4 of 5

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] responded, "Yes, good reminder." On the 22nd of December, FLYNN called a litany of countries to include Israel, the UK, Senegal, Egypt, maybe France and maybe Russia/KISLYAK. Part of the reason for FLYNN's calls was to conduct an exercise to see how fast the incoming administration could get someone on the line. FLYNN likened it to a battle drill to see who the administration could reach in a crisis. The exercise was conducted at the campaign's GSA transition building on 18th and I Streets N.W., which FLYNN described as a somewhat chaotic environment. FLYNN stated he conducted these calls to attempt to get a sense of where countries stood on the UN vote, specifically, whether they intended to vote or abstain.

[REDACTED] The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he made any request or KISLYAK to vote in a particular way or take any action. FLYNN stated he did not. FLYNN stated he did not believe his calls to the various countries would change anything. FLYNN recalled there needed to be a certain number of abstention votes to alter the outcome, and that having looked at the math at the time, he knew it could not be achieved. FLYNN said 14 countries were voting, and had a recollection of the number of five votes being important. In the end, only the U.S. abstained. FLYNN stated his calls were about asking where countries would stand on a vote, not any requests of, "hey if you do this."

[REDACTED] The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he made any comment to KISLYAK about voting in a certain manner, or slowing down the vote, or if KISLYAK described any Russian response to a request by FLYNN. FLYNN answered, "No." FLYNN stated the conversations were along the lines of where do you stand, and what's your position. FLYNN heard through other channels that Egypt did not like the vote, and believed the Egyptians of their own accord delayed the vote a day. FLYNN again stated that he appreciated the interviewing agents reminding him that he had another conversation with KISLYAK.

[REDACTED] The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he recalled any [REDACTED] action with KISLYAK surrounding the expulsion of Russian diplomats or closing of Russian properties in response to Russian hacking activities surrounding the election. FLYNN stated that he did not. FLYNN reiterated his conversation was about the PUTIN/TRUMP VTC and the "Astana thing" (the Kazakhstan conference described earlier). FLYNN noted he was not aware of the then-upcoming actions as he did not have access to television news in the Dominican Republic and his government BlackBerry was not working.



Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Michael Flynn, On 01/24/2017, Page 5 of 5

[REDACTED] The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he recalled any conversation with KISLYAK in which the expulsions were discussed, where FLYNN might have encouraged KISLYAK not to escalate the situation, to keep the Russian response reciprocal, or not to engage in a "tit-for-tat." FLYNN responded, "Not really. I don't remember. It wasn't, 'Don't do anything.'" The U.S. Government's response was a total surprise to FLYNN. FLYNN did not know about the Persona Non-Grata (PNG) action until it was in the media. KISLYAK and FLYNN were starting off on a good footing and FLYNN was looking forward to the relationship. With regard to the scope of the Russians who were expelled, FLYNN said he did not understand it. FLYNN stated he could understand one PNG, but not thirty-five.

[REDACTED] The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he recalled any conversation with KISLYAK in which KISLYAK told him the Government of Russia had taken into account the incoming administration's position about the expulsions, or where KISLYAK said the Government of Russia had responded, or chosen to modulate their response, in any way to the U.S.'s actions as a result of a request by the incoming administration. FLYNN stated it was possible that he talked to KISLYAK on the issue, but if he did, he did not remember doing so. FLYNN stated he was attempting to start a good relationship with KISLYAK and move forward. FLYNN remembered making four to five calls that day about this issue, but that the Dominican Republic was a difficult place to make a call as he kept having connectivity issues. FLYNN reflected and stated he did not think he would have had a conversation with KISLYAK about the matter, as he did not know the expulsions were coming. FLYNN stated he did not have a long drawn out discussion with KISLYAK where he would have asked him to "don't do something."





## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/31/2017

[REDACTED] On January 24, 2017, Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Peter P. Strzok II and [REDACTED], interviewed United States (U.S.) National Security Advisor Michael T. FLYNN, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], at his office at the White House. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, FLYNN provided the following information:

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[REDACTED]

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Investigation on	<u>01/24/2017</u>	at	<u>Person</u>	Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In	
File #	[REDACTED]			Date drafted	<u>01/24/2017</u>
by	[REDACTED]			STRZOK PETER P II	

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Michael Flynn , On 01/24/2017 , Page 2 of 5

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[REDACTED] Prior to the Presidential inauguration, FLYNN spoke to multiple representatives in each of approximately thirty countries' governments. FLYNN stated the only exception to that practice was Russia, in that FLYNN had substantive conversations only with KISLYAK, and no other members of the Government of Russia. FLYNN's interest in Russia was as a common partner in the war on terror. FLYNN does not know if PUTIN and TRUMP will get along, but it is FLYNN's job to figure out paths to work with Russia to fight terrorism. FLYNN named the primary threats to the U.S. as the "four plus one:" China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and ISIS. FLYNN stated if the U.S. could neutralize one of the four, or even better, leverage their cooperation fighting a common enemy such as terrorism, that would be a success for U.S. national security.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Michael Flynn \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/24/2017, Page 3 of 5

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Michael Flynn \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/24/2017, Page 5 of 5

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